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Abstract 
When China’s President Hu Jintao articulated his country’s ‘harmonious world’ (hexie shijie) 
foreign policy perspective at the United Nations’ 60th anniversary in 2005, he spoke of the 
need ‘to preserve the diversity of civilizations in the spirit of equality and openness, make 
international relations more democratic and jointly build a harmonious world where all 
civilizations coexist and accommodate each other.’ This message has retained its salience in 
subsequent years and represents a particular vision of world order that is viewed as the 
‘preferred’ option within current Chinese foreign policy. Where does this vision come from? 
In investigating the ancestry of the current leadership’s policy posture of ‘harmonious world’, 
which has its domestic counterpart in ‘harmonious society’, it is necessary to delve into 
classical Chinese thought.  But more than investigate the past to seek the origins and meaning 
of a key Chinese cultural concept, harmony, this paper also examines the implications of a 
stronger China articulating such a vision. Like the Contention of the Hundred Schools of 
Thought (770-221 BC) which flourished with the passing of the Zhou dynasty and its socio-
political order, so too the sudden end of bipolar strategic competition at the close of the 20th 
century has left the field open to alternative modes of relating as nations and peoples, with 
globalization accelerating the transformative process. Is the world on the threshold of a new 
age of contestation of ideas for how global society advances? China’s focus on constructing a 
‘harmonious world’ is indicative of an attempt to render this Confucian idea as more than 
merely Chinese, that ‘harmonious world’ is, in effect, harmonious with the UN’s vision and 
global governance cooperation in an era dominated by transnational security issues. This 
paper will investigate ‘harmony’ and the notion of humane governance in classical Chinese 
thought when the social order was being contested, as well as the prevailing world order 
when the crucial level of analysis is the global system, with China playing a more active role 
harmonizing dominant and weaker powers, Western and non-Western values.  
 
  
1. Introduction 
 
The global system need not be characterized by a zero-sum mentality of distrust, exclusionary 
politics, and a democratic deficit. In short, discord need not be accepted as the natural order 
of the socio-political universe. Win-win cooperation in security and economic affairs and a 
consultative system of global governance are both conceivable and achievable. Harmonious 
relations in the presence of diversity, rather than the expectation of discordant ones as the 
default setting in international relations, is a project supported by the nation that has risen to 
number two in global economic power while not renouncing its socialist political credentials. 
China’s achievements in this and other sectors suggest its global stance in favour of harmony 
as the defining global concept of the future must be taken seriously. What is this concept as 
expressed by the Chinese government and where does it come from? How does it fit with the 
emergent global system of soft governance in which civil society, multilateral institutions, 
and international regimes are more commonplace in dealing with transnational issues than the 
traditional state-centric international system?  
 
This paper will investigate ‘harmony’ and the notion of humane governance in classical 
Chinese thought when the social order was being contested, as well as the prevailing world 
order when the crucial level of analysis is the global system, with the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) playing a more active role harmonizing dominant and weaker powers, Western 
and non-Western values. 
 
2. ‘Harmony’ and Humane Governance in Classical Chinese Thought 
 
The concept of social harmony is part of a long and deep tradition within Chinese thought 
and culture focused on humane governance, a set of ideals that were valued by dominant 
Confucian1 and syncretic schools of thought even during periods of intense conflict (see 
below). The real problems in achieving interstate and social harmony, moreover, were well 
understood from the 6th century B.C.E. onwards, and formed part of an extensive debate 
ranging across issues such as government, ethics, warfare, human nature, and the ultimate 
meaning of the cosmos and humanity’s place in it. These ideas, and their historical contexts, 
are one channel among the complex inputs transforming government policy within the PRC 
during recent years.  
The ancient, classical and medieval periods of Chinese thought provide a rich resource of 
moral, political and strategic thought that sought to achieve social harmony and political 
stability within a world in which military conflict remained common, and in which issues 
such as power, legitimacy and authority could not be ignored. Thus, harmony was sought 
amid diversity and conflict, and provided one of the keys towards shaping a relatively 
humane vision of governance. Even when overridden by pragmatic necessities or the failure 
of particular rulers, this moral agenda established a pattern of restraint and cultivation that 
emerged as a sophisticated vision of statecraft and government. Though at times Chinese 
                                                          
1
 Confucius (551-479 B.C.E.) was the codifier of Chinese tradition and is regarded as China’s most influential 
philosopher. 
Legalist doctrine favoured a harsher vision of government by laws and punishments, this was 
moderated both by the Confucian emphasis on humanity and the Taoist vision of a ‘way’ (tao) 
that positioned humans naturally within the universe. 
 
2.1 Harmony and Diversity 
 
Harmony (he, 和 ; sometimes transliterated as ho) has been taken as a core doctrine in 
Chinese culture generally and Confucian thought in particular, as found in early Chinese art, 
literature, historical texts and philosophy.2 He in its root sense means ‘and’ and the original 
meaning goes back to singing patterns in which one singer replies to another and thus can be 
said to be in harmony. 3  Thus the root character is indicative of grain and the mouth 
conjoining, and as a concept indicates the proper preparation and taste of food as a balance of 
elements that is satisfying and health-giving.4   
However, it is important to distinguish this concept from ‘identity’ or ‘assent’ since only 
diverse components or different things can be in harmony, and this includes political views 
and the advice of ministers to rulers.5 Thus in the Yijing (I Ching)  one of the early formative 
texts of ancient Chinese culture, harmony is based on a whole modality of complementary 
components in which the transformation of ‘things’ ends strife and leads back dialectically to 
a new harmony.6 Harmony thus becomes an active and transformative principle. In later 
periods he came to take on this notion of a ‘creative process of harmonizing the world by the 
mind which results in a better state of the world’.7 
 
‘Harmony’ readily took on political usages in early Chinese history, e.g. in materials referring 
back to early Zhou (Chou) history: 
 
. . . Hence the former kings gave different surnames to the princes, looked for talent wherever it 
was to be found, chose ministers, took practiced workers and did this so as to increase variety. 
                                                          
2
 KEIGHTLEY, David N. “Early Civilization in China: Reflections on How It Became Chinese”, in ROPP, Paul 
S. (ed.) Heritage of China: Contemporary Perspectives on Chinese Civilization, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1990, p43. 
3
 ZHANG, Dainian Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy, trans. Edmund Ryden, Beijing, Foreign Languages 
Press, 2005, p270. 
4
 CHENG, Chung-ying “On Harmony as Transformation: Paradigms from the I Ching”, Journal of Chinese 
Philosophy, 16 no. 2, June 1989, p227; WU, Joseph S. “Basic Characteristics of Chinese Culture”, 
Comprehensive Harmony: e-Journal for Comparative Philosophy and Culture, Vol. I, No.3, Fall, 2004, 
http://www.thomehfang.com/suncrates3/1wu.html (accessed 11.12.09) 
5
 ZHANG, Dainian Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy, trans. Edmund Ryden, Beijing, Foreign Languages 
Press, 2005, pp270-271; CHENG, Chung-ying “On Harmony as Transformation: Paradigms from the I Ching”, 
Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 16 no. 2, June 1989, pp229. See further below. 
6
 CHENG, Chung-ying “On Harmony as Transformation: Paradigms from the I Ching”, Journal of Chinese 
Philosophy, 16 no. 2, June 1989, p230, p247. 
7
 Ibid., p236. 
If voices are the same no one will listen; if things are alike none have decoration; if tastes are 
the same there is no fruit; if things are the same there is nothing to talk about.8  
 
This is most explicitly expressed in the ‘Doctrine of the Mean’ (Zhongyong, the Mean), 
leading step-by-step from individual equilibrium to social, political and cosmic harmony.9 
This text was influential from the Han period onwards but had elements drawn from much 
earlier traditions.10 Harmony takes on a central explanatory role for the cosmos and society: 
 
Before pleasure, anger, sorrow and joy have arisen, this is called centrality. After they have 
arisen and have attained their appropriate degree, this is called harmony. Equilibrium is the 
great root of the world, and harmony is the pervasive Way of the world. Once centrality and 
harmony are realized, Heaven and Earth take their proper places and all living things are 
nourished.11 
 
In classical Chinese thought this orientation leads to an emphasis on social harmony and the 
regulation of human relations as the basis of family, society and government, including a 
harmonious differentiation of class roles.12 Thus the gentleman (the chun-tzu or junzi, the 
superior or educated man) ‘harmonizes’ but is not a ‘yes’ man, indicating his ability to make 
distinctions and work within his social setting without being subservient, fawning or 
conformist.13  
 
The concept of harmony is either explicitly deployed or implicit across most early Confucian 
doctrinal texts (the Five Classics and the Four Books, the latter becoming the basis of 
imperial examinations). At the most developed, some Confucian thought went as far as 
positing a ‘great unity’, a utopian society in which hierarchy and force was not needed, a 
concept further developed in the 19th century in the socialist utopia outlined by Kang Youwei, 
showing some parallels with communist thought and the ‘equal community for all’ concept 
                                                          
8
 Sayings of the States [Guo Yu] 16, ‘Sayings of Zheng’, pp515-516, in ZHANG, Dainian Key Concepts in 
Chinese Philosophy, trans. Edmund Ryden, Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 2005, p271. 
9
 LI, Yi-Yuan “Notions of Time, Space and Harmony in Chinese Popular Culture”, in HUANG, Chun-Chieh & 
ZÜRCHER, Erik (ed.) Time and Space in Chinese Culture, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1995, pp394-395.  
10
 De BARY, Wm. Theodore and Irene Bloom (comp.) Sources of Chinese Tradition, Vol. 1, 2nd edn, New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1999, pp333-334. 
11
 The Mean, 1, translated in De Bary & Bloom, Sources of Chinese Tradition, 1999, p334. 
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 KEIGHTLEY, David N. “Early Civilization in China: Reflections on How It Became Chinese”, in ROPP, 
Paul S. (ed.) Heritage of China: Contemporary Perspectives on Chinese Civilization, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1990, p53; BODDE, Derk “Harmony and Conflict n Chinese Philosophy”, in WRIGHT, 
Arthur F. (ed.) Studies in Chinese Thought, University of Chicago Press, 1953, p48; CHENG, Chung-ying “On 
Harmony as Transformation: Paradigms from the I Ching”, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 16 no. 2, June 1989, 
p233, following Confucius Analects XVI.1. 
13
 Analects XIII.23; CHENG, Chung-ying “On Harmony as Transformation: Paradigms from the I Ching”, 
Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 16 no. 2, June 1989, p232; ZHANG, Dainian Key Concepts in Chinese 
Philosophy, trans. Edmund Ryden, Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 2005, p272; DELURY, John 
“’Harmonious’ in China”, Policy Review, No. 148, April & May 2008, p42; MORTON, W. Scott & LEWIS, 
Charlton M. China: Its History and Culture, 4th edition, N.Y., McGraw-Hill Inc., 2004, pp36-37. 
put forward by Sun Yatsen.14 This notion was expressed in the early Confucian text known as 
the Great Learning and then made more explicit through the concept of the Datong (ta-t'ung), 
usually translated as 'Great Community' or 'Great Unity'.  
 
This model can be re-conceptualized as a 'Great Harmony', based on a harmonized and 
diverse society, rather than on any false concept of rigid compliance or strict unity.15 Such a 
Datong, however, was only possible under ideal conditions and as such it may have been 
‘construed more as a meta-historical or ahistorical model of political and social excellence’.16 
Much of the writing in the Confucian tradition recognized limitations among the common 
people, gentlemen and rulers that led to ages of decline, chaos and partial achievement, and 
sought to rectify these problems with an extended body of theory and practical morality.17 In 
an ideal sense, the Emperor would come to be viewed, at least by the time of the Tang, as a 
‘Grand Harmonizer’, who through bringing peace to the realm, creating social order, 
engaging in proper rituals and regulating the calendar, was indeed the Son of Heaven.18  
 
Confucian cosmology sought to link heaven, earth and humankind to form a great triad, 
providing humans with a crucial place in the world order, which ‘is a state of the utmost 
                                                          
14
 DELURY, John “‘Harmonious’ in China”, Policy Review, No. 148, April & May 2008, p38; MORTON, W. 
Scott & LEWIS, Charlton M. China: Its History and Culture, 4th edition, N.Y., McGraw-Hill Inc., 2004, p171; 
KWONG, Luke S.W. “The Rise of the Linear Perspective on History and Time in Late Qing China c. 1860-
1911”, Past & Present, no. 173, 2001, p173. By the time of late Han, Taoist religious thought could entertain 
sentiments such as ‘What human beings can imagine they can always bring about”, T’ai-p’ing ching ho-chiao 
18-34.25 in HOLCOMBE, Charles In the Shadow of the Han: Literati Thought and Society at the Beginning of 
the Southern Dynasties, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1994, p104.  Later utopian concepts such as 
‘Taiping’, Great Peace, were mobilized as part of a progressive historical schema by some late Qing thinkers, 
KWONG, Luke S.W. “The Rise of the Linear Perspective on History and Time in Late Qing China c. 1860-
1911”, Past & Present, no. 173, 2001, pp167-168. The revolutionary implication of such utopian ideas was 
shown by the actual practice of the Taiping revolutionaries in the mid-18th centuries, who in their effort to set up 
the Taiping Tianguo (Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace) engaged in fierce warfare that ravaged much of 
Southeast China, MORTON, W. Scott & LEWIS, Charlton M. China: Its History and Culture, 4th edition, N.Y., 
McGraw-Hill Inc., 2004, p157. A retreat from government and society into a ‘utopian communal ideal’ is found 
in early Taoist thought as well as in writing from the Eastern Jin, such as T’ao Chi’ien’s (365-427) Peach 
Blossom Spring story (reflected in numerous later paintings, e.g. by the 16th century Ch'iu Ying), and in the 
retirement from ‘active service’ trends by many early Sung literati, HOLCOMBE, Charles In the Shadow of the 
Han: Literati Thought and Society at the Beginning of the Southern Dynasties, Honolulu, University of Hawaii 
Press, 1994, p55, p84. 
15
 See further CHENG, Chung-ying “On Harmony as Transformation: Paradigms from the I Ching”, Journal of 
Chinese Philosophy, 16 no. 2, June 1989, p234; FERGUSON, R. James "Confucius, Mencius, and the 
Participatory Society", in Martin Lu, Rosita Dellios, R. James Ferguson (eds), Toward A Global Community: 
New Perspectives on Confucian Humanism, Bond University and International Confucian Association, Gold 
Coast, Australia, 2004, pp151-177. 
16
 KWONG, Luke S.W. “The Rise of the Linear Perspective on History and Time in Late Qing China c. 1860-
1911”, Past & Present, no. 173, 2001, p165. 
17
 See Analects quotes; BODDE, Derk “Harmony and Conflict n Chinese Philosophy”, in WRIGHT, Arthur F. 
(ed.) Studies in Chinese Thought, University of Chicago Press, 1953, p68. Thus for Ch’êng Yi (1033-1107) even 
the prosperous Han and Tang had still ‘adulterated’ the ‘Way’ of the Sage Kings, De BARY, W. Theodore “A 
Reappraisal of Neo-Confucianism”, in WRIGHT, Arthur F. (ed.) Studies in Chinese Thought, University of 
Chicago Press, 1953, pp97-100. 
18
 WECHSLER, Howard J. Offerings of Jade and Silk: Ritual and Symbol in the Legitimation of the T’ang 
Dynasty, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985, pp212-213. 
harmony and ultimate goal of Confucian education’.19 The linkage of ‘natural’ and ‘social’ 
order was not just wishful thinking. This quest was not a purely religious impulse (though 
later on influenced by Taoist and to a lesser extent Buddhist conceptions). It was a desperate 
and essential search for social and political harmony by an agricultural society subject to 
extended periods of intense warfare. This was especially true of the later Zhou (Chou) period 
(from 770 B.C.E. onwards) with its quest for interstate peace, and of later imperial periods 
(post-221 B.C.E.) where rebellions, followed at later times by external invasion, division of 
the empire, and the extinction of dynastic lines, were real threats.20 The emphasis on a unified 
empire was due to bitter experience.  
 
The relative stability of the early Han, early Tang, and culturally the Sung dynasties was seen 
as a product of these philosophies put into practice, while the failure or end of dynasties was 
often interpreted as failures in ritual conduct, declining morality and poor government 
policies. 
 
2.2 Overcoming Conflict: The Legacies of Warfare 
 
What is masked by these philosophical traditions is that early Chinese states had good reason 
to fear disorder, disharmony, rebellion and destructive warfare. In the Spring and Autumn 
period most of central China was supposedly under the hierarchical system of cities and 
regions owing ultimate allegiance to the Zhou Emperor. The first three centuries of this 
period, called the Western Zhou, were still quite vigorous, but once the capital was forced to 
move to the east, after a disastrous attack on the royal domain in the Xi'an region by 
barbarians and 'disaffected vassals' in 771 B.C.E., the Zhou went into political decline.21  
 
In large measure the history of the period from 771 B.C.E. to 221 B.C.E. (covering the period 
of the Eastern Zhou, including the Spring and Autumn period, and the Warring States period) 
was a record of interstate conflict as the central authority of the Zhou empire lapsed, leading 
to intensifying warfare, social turmoil, the extinction of small states by strong powers, and to 
the eventual reunification of empire under the Qin dynasty. 
 
In the later part of this period sophisticated theories and practices of governance, diplomacy 
and warfare emerged. There was a desperate search for legitimacy and enhanced capacity by 
these states as they faced their peers. These struggles demanded internal cohesion and 
harmony before any kind of interstate stabilisation or ‘peace’ was possible. The dangers and 
terrible reality of military conflict emerged as one of the truisms of the period. Though a 
crude militarism was generally disdained in later Chinese culture, its necessity was 
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 CHENG, Chung-Ying “Education for Morality in Global and Cosmic Contexts: The Confucian Model”, 
Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 33 no. 4, December 2006, pp562-563. 
20
 BARNES, Gina L. China, Korea and Japan: The Rise of Civilization in East Asia, London, Thames & 
Hudson, 1993, p206. 
21
 HAW, Stephen G. China: A Cultural History, London, Batsford, 1990, pp48-9. 
recognized as part of wider conceptualization of statecraft.22 In the formative period of the 
Eastern Zhou the arts of warfare, state organisation, economics 23  and diplomacy were 
developed under the threat of major invasions and the possible extinction of a princely line 
and the state itself. It has been estimated that for the entire Spring and Autumn period less 
than 50 years were without warfare. 24  It is therefore not surprising that warfare would 
become one of the necessary tools of statecraft, and that during this period Sun Tzu could 
open his famous text, the Art of War, with the lines: ‘War is a vital matter to the state, an area 
of life or death, a path to survival or extinction; it must be investigated.’25 
 
The ideals of Confucian thought were not developed by ignoring the realities of power and 
conflict, but were a direct reaction to them. Within the limits of the time, they sought to 
create a language and ideology of governance that would regulate the action of rulers, 
aristocrats, officials, and ordinary people. In doing so they moved beyond regulation and 
punishment to an embracing theory of how order could be achieved within a diverse society 
made up persons with different abilities and shared needs. 
 
2.3 Harmony of Concepts 
 
In Confucian thought, harmony was linked to a range of important concepts: ren 
(benevolence), li (rules of propriety), zhong (‘equilibrium or centrality of the mind’ or 
‘loyalty’, ‘central-mindedness’, equilibrium as ‘central-heartedness’), shu and yi (variously 
interpreted as morality, righteousness or even justice).26 These values, activated through the 
cultivated and committed person or a sage-king, could become the basis of a pragmatic and 
humanitarian system of government (renzheng).27 It is important to sense how these different 
concepts are organically linked, though there is always a danger of over-systematising the 
early thought of the Confucian ‘school’, as found in the laconic statements collected together 
in the Analects for example. In the longer term, it is also important to recognize that 
Confucian thought was not just one ‘thing’, but rather an evolving tradition in which a great 
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 As noted in the Chin dynasty, ‘A warrior managing affairs of state is like letting a wolf tend sheep’, 
HOLCOMBE, Charles In the Shadow of the Han: Literati Thought and Society at the Beginning of the Southern 
Dynasties, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1994, p58. 
23
 CHANG, James L.Y. "History of Chinese Economic Thought: Overview of Recent Works", History of 
Political Economy, 19 no. 3, 1987, p483. 
24
 HAW, Stephen G. China: A Cultural History, London, Batsford, 1990, p54. 
25
 Sun Tzu I.1. See further BALMFORTH, Edmund Elliot A Chinese Military Strategist of the Warring States, 
Sun Pin, New Brunswick, Rutgers University of New Jersey, PhD Thesis, 1979 (University Microfilms 
International), p12. 
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 CHENG, Chung-ying “On Harmony as Transformation: Paradigms from the I Ching”, Journal of Chinese 
Philosophy, 16 no. 2, June 1989, p231, p236; CHENG, Chung-Ying “Education for Morality in Global and 
Cosmic Contexts: The Confucian Model”, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 33 no. 4, December 2006, pp561. 
27
 MORTON, W. Scott & LEWIS, Charlton M. China: Its History and Culture, 4th edition, N.Y., McGraw-Hill 
Inc., 2004, p114; SATO, Masayuki Confucian State and the Society of Li: A Study on the Political Thought of 
Xun Zi, Leuven, Daiwa Bank Foundation, 2001, pp195-197. 
variety of contesting ideas were hammered out, with periods of partial orthodoxy emerging in 
the Han and then in the Sung dynasties.  
 
In this process, core words were transformed into powerful principles. Confucius took the 
idea of ren and transformed it into an articulated virtue. The central starting place for the 
development of this human quality is the relationship between child and parents. Moral 
development begins in the family context, but also affects other social and political relations. 
From this we can see that for the Confucian tradition, politics was ethics played out at the 
national level. Furthermore, the roots of the superior person, the junzi (chun-tze) – that is, 
those fit for office – lie with certain basic qualities, such as obedience, self-sacrifice, 
truthfulness, and benevolence. Metaphorically, ren points at the proper relationship between 
human beings as the very core of the Confucian social message.28  
 
Harmony, then, is one important concept supported by a sophisticated ethical and political 
language that evolved during the Warring States period. This language was readily adapted to 
the craft of governance, even as formal state systems emerged in ancient China. It was part of 
a moral-political theory developed by early Confucianism, partly in opposition to the harsher 
Legalist methods of rule, and partly a critique of early Taoism and Mohism. 29  The 
maintenance of order and harmony emerged at the core of debates on statecraft that was taken 
up by many groups, e.g. in the Jixia Academy of the late fourth and third centuries B.C.E., 
later Huang-Lao conceptions of imperial rule,30 and in the ‘orthodox’ Confucian tradition as 
developed in the Han and Sung periods. Achieving harmony was an active human process, a 
harmonisation and regulation of differences that was at the heart of governance. It is no 
surprise, therefore, that the Confucian philosopher Mencius (372–289 B.C.E.) would argue 
that the three crucial factors for a state included natural resources and good climate, but most 
importantly the need for human harmony (ren-he).31 
 
3. PRC Policy Context for the Return of Harmony 
 
While the philosophical origin of ‘harmony’ may be traced to classical Chinese thought, it is 
new in terms of ‘new China’s’ policy orientation. Born of revolution, the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) emphasized struggle over harmony. The latter, with its Confucian 
connotations, was considered by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) a ‘feudal’ remnant of a 
class-structured society. This view changed soon after the death of China’s revolutionary 
                                                          
28
 FOX, Russell Arben "Confucian and Communitarian Responses to Liberal Democracy", The Review of 
Politics, 59 no. 3, Summer 1997 
29
 Mohism is a school of thought named after Mo Tzu (Mozi, 470-391 B.C.E.) whose text is of the same name, 
the Mo Tzu. He taught that social well-being derives from ‘universal love’ or impartiality (rather than favouring 
an inner circle of family and nation). 
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 Based on the founding myths of the Yellow Emperor and the view of special qualities and powers held by a 
ruler, WECHSLER, Howard J. Offerings of Jade and Silk: Ritual and Symbol in the Legitimation of the T’ang 
Dynasty, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985, p204. 
31
 Mencius IIB.1; CHENG, Chung-ying “On Harmony as Transformation: Paradigms from the I Ching”, 
Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 16 no. 2, June 1989, p233, following Mencius 2B.1. 
leader Mao Zedong in 1976. At the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central 
Committee in December 1978, the ‘second generation’ leadership under Deng Xiaoping 
launched the ‘reform and opening up’ policy. It replaced the Marxist rhetoric of ‘class 
struggle’ in favour of a market oriented (capitalist) policy of economic development. ‘To get 
rich is glorious,’ was Deng’s advice at the time. Moreover, the ‘colour of the cat’ did not 
matter, he instructed in metaphorical terms, as long as it ‘caught mice’ (became rich). With 
an average of 9% annual growth since then, the Chinese cat grew fat on this policy, but 
divisions in society returned. On the one hand, China’s successful economic growth has 
meant a reduction in poverty in absolute terms - from 65% to 10%, according to the World 
Bank; on the other, ‘China is no longer the low-inequality country it was a quarter century 
ago’.32 
 
Wealth disparity grew between individuals, between provinces and between rural and urban 
dwellers. The coastal regions which were developed first through Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs) fared better than the Western interior; rural incomes dropped to less than a third of 
their urban counterparts.33 The government has come to view this as a ‘serious threat to social 
stability’. 34  After all, the Chinese communist revolution of the early 20th century was 
supposed to have emancipated the masses from the oppression of the aristocracy; in other 
words, to have overcome stark social inequalities. Tradition was blamed for holding China 
back through ‘counter-revolutionary’ feudal ethics that favoured the aristocracy. Yet the 
teachings of Confucius did not endorse the abandonment of the poor to their misery or the 
exploitation of one class of humans by another, but emphasized empathy: ‘ren’ (benevolence, 
see above) is the core virtue in Confucianism.  
 
Paralleling the wealth gap of people-to-people relations, there emerged an environmental one 
of human-to-nature relations. Instead of humans being in harmony with nature, as classical 
philosophy taught, China’s rapid industrialization brought into conflict the human-
environment relationship, whereby the environment is both ecosystem and source of 
livelihood. The price of industrial development has meant that the health of both citizens and 
the environment they inhabit has suffered, and arable land has diminished in relation to the 
vast rural population.35 Environmental problems such as pollution have accounted for a 30% 
annual increase in the tens of thousands of ‘mass incidents’ against government policies, 
according to China's environmental protection ministry.36  
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 The desire for social justice and ‘virtuous’ government has not gone unanswered. Rather than 
turning to Western democratic or revolutionary rhetoric, the Chinese Communist Party 
looked to rehabilitating the previously maligned classical tradition. As noted by John Delury, 
‘Beginning in the late 1980s, the concept of a “harmonious society” (hexie shehui) rose 
steadily from keyword to buzzword to paradigm.’37 Even though President Jiang Zemin, of 
the third generation leadership, used the ‘harmony’ rhetoric, 38 it was his successor, Hu Jintao 
who officiated over its adoption as a ‘paradigm’. Indeed, ‘harmonious society’ and its 
counterpart of a ‘harmonious world’ (hexie shijie) have become the distinguishing feature of 
the fourth generation leadership of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao.  
 
Hu Jintao proposed the construction of a ‘harmonious society’ during the 2005 National 
People’s Congress (NPC, China’s legislature – the highest organ of state power) and in 2006 
it became part of China’s 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010), approved by the NPC in 2006. 
The Plan entailed ‘scientific, harmonious and peaceful development’ for the ‘goal of building 
a well-off society in an all-round manner’. It included the strengthening of ‘ethical education’ 
to ‘make fresh achievements in building a harmonious society’.39 The 12th FYP (2011–2015), 
is expected to improve the balance of societal, economic and environmental relations through 
better social services, reforming income distribution, and ‘greening’ the economy.40  
 
The Strategic Planning Department of the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) under the Chinese State Council (responsible for formulating and implementing the 
FYP strategies of socio-economic development) would like to see less dependence on exports 
and a stronger domestic market. This has an implication for China’s international outlook. A 
2010 report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has found that 
China’s foreign policy is being shaped by a wider range of interests than the ‘traditional 
power structure’: 
 
The authors also observe that the emergence of new foreign policy actors has resulted in a 
multitude of approaches within China to the country’s internationalization. On the one hand, 
the Ministry of Commerce, local governments and large companies, for example, favour China 
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becoming a more active international player. They advocate free trade agreements, regional 
development projects and greater investment opportunities. 
 
On the other hand, actors such as the National Development and Reform Commission want 
China to avoid an over-reliance on world markets and view China’s foreign policy in terms of 
the benefits it brings for economic development. The Ministry of State Security, in turn, is 
concerned that an increasing prevalence of Western values will make it more difficult for the 
Communist Party to dominate public discourse on questions concerning human rights, 
transparency and accountability. 41 
 
This diversification of domestic policy inputs and the crossover between domestic and 
foreign policy reflects the interaction between harmony at home and abroad. At a practical 
defensive level, ‘harmonious society’ and ‘harmonious world’ are designed to stave off social 
instability at home and suspicion abroad. On a longer term proactive basis, their role is to 
transform China’s society and politics into a hybrid Confucian-Socialism that cushions 
domestic upheaval and shapes global governance. In antiquity, it was a ‘creative process of 
harmonizing the world by the mind which results in a better state of the world’ (see above, 
2.1). 
 
A restoration of ‘harmony’ within the national discourse means that the CCP has found 
contemporary relevance for traditional culture while not renouncing its socialist ideology. 
The retention of Marxist-Leninist thinking may be considered incompatible with Confucian 
values, yet this duality comes easily to a culture of yin-yang correlativity. Foreign systems 
which China has adopted – from Marxism to capitalism and even the ‘Revolution in Military 
Affairs’ (RMA) – are best indigenized through appending ‘Chinese characteristics’. Hence 
‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ permits not only the development of a market 
economy but also the regeneration of traditional philosophy for China’s continued longevity. 
Those selected for the fifth generation leadership (such as Xi Jinping and Le Keqiang) at the 
next party congress in 2012 will be far removed from the Chinese revolution of 1949, but 
strategically immersed in the twin phenomena of (1) globalization and (2) China’s ‘peaceful’ 
rise within it, under the ‘harmonious-socialist’ paradigm. 
  
It is therefore instructive that Confucius is no longer vilified as a class enemy, but has been 
put to productive use at home and abroad. Domestically, a Confucian harmony is sought to 
fill the values vacuum left by Marx, to replace the avariciousness of capitalism, and to ensure 
the CCP retains the Mandate of Heaven (legitimacy in the eyes of the people),42 all the while 
working to restore greater equilibrium in society. Internationally, Confucius has been 
employed as the emblem of Chinese identity: more than 280 Confucius Institutes (much like 
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France’s Alliance Française and Germany’s Goethe Institute) have been established around 
the world to teach Chinese language and culture. Confucian ethics underpins China’s good 
neighbourly relations. 43  An outstanding example was the 2008 Beijing Olympics which 
featured traditional China as its identity statement to its own people and to the world.  
 
While the Opening Ceremony began with the beating of traditional drums and the explosion of 
fireworks, 3000 Confucian disciples did welcome guests with the opening lines of The Analects: 
“Is it not delightful to have friends coming from distant quarters?” which was followed by other 
aphorisms including the communitarian theme of “all those within the four seas are brothers.”44 
 
4. Contemporary Chronology and Content of ‘Harmonious World’ (hexie shijie) 
China’s ‘harmonious world’ advocacy is included in the government white paper, China's 
Peaceful Development Road, released in December 2005, under the sub-heading, ‘Building a 
Harmonious World of Sustained Peace and Common Prosperity’. This has become a 
paradigmatic slogan oft-repeated in official speeches and documents; the phrase was adopted 
as an amendment to the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party at the CCP 17th party 
congress on 21 October 2007.45  
 
Even though Hu Jintao first broached the idea of building a harmonious world during his 
May 2003 visit to Moscow,46 the ‘harmonious world’ concept’s most celebrated international 
launch occurred at the premier global platform, the United Nations, during its 60th 
anniversary in 2005.47 Addressing the UN General Assembly on 15 September, Hu Jintao 
spoke of the need ‘to preserve the diversity of civilizations in the spirit of equality and 
openness, make international relations more democratic and jointly build a harmonious world 
where all civilizations coexist and accommodate each other.’ 48  He offered a four-point 
proposal for building a harmonious world: (1) security cooperation for peace, (2) economic 
cooperation for prosperity, (3) inter-civilizational dialogue for mutual respect, and (4) 
reforms to the UN for strengthening its global governance role. Hu Jintao maintained his 
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message, with the 2009 address to the UN General Assembly also being based on a ‘four-
point proposal on building a harmonious world’.49  
 
Like the ‘four modernizations’ (of agriculture, industry, science & technology, and national 
defence) which marked the beginning of the ‘reform and opening period’, the four proposals 
for ‘harmonious world’ were adjusted in accordance with the demands of the times. In the 
former case, defence was the third ‘modernisation’ in 1975, but was demoted to fourth under 
Deng Xiaoping’s economic focus. Moreover, the modernization of defence required a higher 
technological base from which to operate; thus science and technology came third. Similarly, 
with the four points proposed in 2005, when reform to the UN was high on the agenda, a 
change occurred in favour of transnational problems – especially climate change. Thus in 
2009 points 1 and 2 on security and economy remained, but point 3 became cooperation on 
transnational problems such as ‘climate change, food security, energy and resource security 
and public health security’50 and point 4 retained the inter-civilizational message of tolerance 
and trust: ‘Countries should acknowledge differences in cultural tradition, social system and 
values and respect the right of all countries to independently choose their development 
paths’.51 Here the cultural and economic points find common purpose. Meanwhile, the UN 
has been subsumed in all the points – including the need to address transnational issues and to 
give developing countries a stronger voice as part of the ‘democratization of international 
relations’, placing it at the centre of global governance.52 In this way, the principle (doctrine) 
remains but the strategy alters to account for the empirical realities that China faces.  
 
As indicated from a number of official public statements, the content of ‘harmonious world’ 
is process-based (in keeping with harmony as an active and transformative principle in 
classical thought), with recurring themes of security cooperation for peace; economic 
cooperation for prosperity; inter-civilizational dialogue for mutual respect; and cooperation in 
global governance. It has been criticized as vague, ambiguous, and insufficiently coherent,53 
though these are not necessarily faults in a world where flexibility rather than dogma best 
serves the needs of a far from static global society. After all, globalization itself represents a 
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dynamic process and global governance (like China’s socialism) may be considered to be at 
an early stage of development. Moreover, the four points put forth for ‘harmonious world’ are 
not the subject of the slogan – they are not the ‘four harmonies’ – as has occurred with the 
‘four modernizations’, the ‘three represents’54 and other numerical formulations commonly 
found in CCP policy statements. They are an interface of conditions deemed worthy of global 
society’s attention. This softer approach contrasts with communist rhetoric. 
 
5. Harmony and Humane Governance in 21st Century Global Society 
 
Having examined the conceptual deployment of harmony past and present in China, what of 
its role in emerging efforts at global governance under conditions of a strengthening China? 
Like the Contention of the Hundred Schools of Thought (770–221 B.C.E) which flourished 
with the passing of the Zhou dynasty and its socio-political order, so too the sudden end of 
bipolar strategic competition at the close of the 20th century has left the field open to 
alternative modes of relating as nations and peoples, with globalization accelerating the 
transformative process. Is the world on the threshold of a new age of contestation of ideas for 
how global society advances? China’s focus on constructing a ‘harmonious world’ is 
indicative of an attempt to render this Confucian idea (with elements of Taoism and 
Buddhism, given the syncretism that has evolved among all three traditions) as more than 
merely Chinese;55 that ‘harmonious world’ is, in effect, harmonious with the UN’s vision and 
global governance cooperation in an era dominated by transnational security issues. For this 
reason it is worthwhile investigating the contents of harmonious world, what they imply for 
China, and how they relate to other world governance concepts – notably:  
 
• Hegemonic governance under the US (more commonly known as unipolarity) 
• Its conceptual rival in the form of a renewed concert of powers56  
• The European Union’s pooling of sovereignty as an evolved form of global 
regionalism (supranationalism) 
• A revitalized United Nations as the centre of a wider global governance entailing a 
global civil society based on norms rather than power, and international regimes and 
institutions as the mechanism for world order. 
 
The above interact with one another but represent distinctive approaches in the direction of 
governance. Meanwhile, security cooperation, common prosperity, cooperation for dealing 
with transnational problems, and inter-civilizational trust are hallmarks of the now entrenched 
‘harmonious world’ perspective of the world’s foremost candidate for global power status in 
the 21st century.  If China is indeed rising peacefully, then it is unlikely to seek hegemonic 
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governance, though it shows both the capability (through its rise) and intent (through its 
rhetoric) to dilute any form of hegemonic governance. Similarly, if it is rising equitably in the 
company of others, making ‘international relations more democratic’, it will eschew a 
privileged concert of powers. The EU’s pooling of sovereignty model may clash with China’s 
more restrictive views on sovereignty. The UN, with its respect for sovereignty but its 
emphasis on international cooperation through elaborate global governance structures, 
provides the most ‘harmonious’ model for the globalization of Confucian governance. Below 
are the key contents of ‘harmonious world’ and, briefly, how they relate to philosophical 
antecedents, China’s rise, as well as prevailing ideas on governance. 
 
5.1. ‘First, we should view security in a broader perspective and safeguard world peace and 
stability.’57 
 
Security cooperation for ‘enduring peace’ is presented in official articulations as a 
multilateral enterprise of collective security under the auspices of the UN, with an emphasis 
on China’s ‘new security concept featuring trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation’.58 
In relation to international peace, China is quick to proclaim its own peaceful intentions and 
that it does not seek hegemony. The unity of diverse nations in cooperating for peace through 
the UN is suggestive of the Chinese holistic philosophy of ‘unity of principle and the 
diversity of its particularizations’. 59  It also echoes Mencius who sought to spread 
Confucianism as the political ideology among the warring states as he believed this would 
lead to unity and end warfare.60  
 
Security, in 21st century ‘harmonious world’ parlance, is more broadly defined: ‘Traditional 
and non-traditional security threats are intertwined, involving political, military, economic, 
cultural and other fields. They are our common challenges that require a joint and 
comprehensive response.’61 This fits with the trend in security studies that has expanded from 
military ‘balances’ to include non-traditional security threats such as terrorism and areas that 
have been ‘securitized’ such as ethnic tension – that is, non-military issues that have an 
impact on a security.  Because many non-traditional security issues are transnational (e.g. 
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climate change, crime, pandemics), the state is not the only unit of analysis. Regional and 
global levels of analysis are also relevant. When it comes to the militarization of outer space, 
China upholds the UN’s position of the peaceful use of space. Given that the US is the most 
advanced in space capabilities,62 this would detract from US preponderance of power, and 
hence opposes hegemonic governance as a theory for world governance. Such a theory holds 
that global stability is based on a strong hegemonic power that guarantees the prevailing 
system.63 
 
5.2. ‘Second, we should take a more holistic approach to development and promote 
common prosperity.’ 64 
 
Economic cooperation for ‘common prosperity’ often employs the ‘win-win’ formula, 
indicating that China’s own economic development is a positive force for the world. An 
emphasis is placed on assisting developing countries to ‘enhance capacity for self-
development’.65 At the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) Summit in April 2010, Hu 
Jintao called for resolving the ‘imbalance in global economic governance structure’ and 
‘increasing the representation and voice of emerging markets and developing countries’.66 
This does not imply support for the Western-coined ‘Beijing Consensus’67 as an alternative 
development model to that of the West (specifically, the hegemonic ‘Washington 
Consensus’). Unlike Maoist China’s export of revolution, today’s China is careful not to seek 
hegemony in economic models or embark on another ideological cold war era. Also, in 
keeping with the Confucian superior person (junzi) philosophy (see above), ‘China will never 
seek to advance its interests at the expense of others’.68  
 
5.3 ‘Third, we should pursue cooperation with a more open mind and work for mutual 
benefit and common progress.’ 69 
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Climate change was uppermost on the global agenda when Hu Jinato made this statement in 
2009 at the UN. The decade had been characterized by transnational problems that required 
cooperation, beginning with the UN’s eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),70 and 
the ‘war on terror’ waged by the US and its allies; and concluding with the global financial 
crisis which saw the rise of the influential Group of Twenty (G20) Finance Ministers and 
Central Bank Governors.71 It marked the inclusion of large developing countries to decision-
making ranks. China’s championing of this cooperative global governance indicates 
recognition of a global and not only regional path of development. It fits in with the 
expanding circles of cultivation in Confucian philosophy, from the self, to family, society, 
nation, the world and the biosphere (nature); and the above noted (2.1) ‘Doctrine of the Mean’ 
speaking of a transition from individual equilibrium to social, political and cosmic harmony.  
 
The way in which global threats have focused the global mind on cooperation with purpose 
suggests that this era’s conditions are ripe for Confucius – once again. Viewed in conjunction 
with the UN and its endorsement as seen in the MDGs of a cosmopolitan global governance 
(cosmopolitanism being a humanist counterpart to globalization), Confucian values may find 
compatibility with 21st century evolving norms. 
 
5.4 ‘Fourth, we should be more tolerant to one another and live together in harmony.’ 72 
 
The quest for inter-civilizational dialogue for mutual respect draws on: the above need to 
cooperate to solve global problems; the ‘unity of principle and the diversity of its 
particularizations’; as well as highlighting the relationship between harmony and diversity 
(see 2.1 above). Former PRC president Jiang Zemin expressed the idea well during his visit 
to the US in 2002: 
 
Confucius said more than two thousand years ago, "In human relationships, a gentleman seeks 
harmony but not uniformity." That is to say, harmony but not sameness; reserving differences 
without coming into conflict. Harmony promotes co-existence and co-prosperity; whereas 
differences foster mutual complementation and mutual support. Harmony without sameness is 
an important principle in the development of all social affairs and relationships and in guiding 
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people's conduct and behavior. Indeed, it is the essential factor of the harmonious development 
of all civilizations.73 
 
At his UN speech in 2005 President Hu Jintao spoke of the need ‘to preserve the diversity of 
civilizations in the spirit of equality and openness, make international relations more 
democratic and jointly build a harmonious world where all civilizations coexist and 
accommodate each other.’74 Quite apart from endorsing a more pluralistic world, respect for 
difference justifies China’s emergence as a non-Western nation, with a socialist political 
ideology, in a Western liberal dominated world order. China need not become an American 
clone. Yet the interdependence of nations under conditions of globalisation suggests that 
China with all its difference must cooperate and coordinate with others for common security 
and prosperity (all the above three points).  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Harmony and humane governance have been deployed in contesting the social order in 
classical Chinese thought as well as 21st century global society where the phenomenon of 
global governance is still unfolding. In the classical past the Confucian teachings of a 
harmony concept that is inclusive of diversity took root and preserved the Chinese 
civilization-state for two millennia after the upheavals of the Warring States period. So, too, 
global society in the 21st century is in dire need of governance without world government, in 
that the nation-state remains a vital actor but with the acceptance that it must work with non-
government actors and cooperate on a regional and global scale to overcome transnational 
problems that threaten the state’s very existence. There is not so much a warring states period 
that requires unity for peace but a interdependent states period in which cooperation and even 
in parts the ‘pooling’ of sovereignty that is necessary for survival and civilized life. 
 
Such a transition to a global level of analysis has been made possible through China’s 
learning from the West as well as from its own cultural resources. Above all, the country has 
been forced to think in this way in view of its modernization program that requires overseas 
markets, investment and resources to continue. That such a global program is being 
conducted under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party with its adherence to 
socialist values suggests that China’s contribution to global governance will not only be 
based on Confucian ethics but also socialistic ones. Armed with a Confucian-Socialism China 
can be expected to play a more active role harmonizing dominant and weaker powers, 
Western and non-Western values. It will, however, need to harmonize its own defensive, 
sovereignty-guarding stance with a new emerging global correlativity: that is, the 
interdependent states period which becomes correlative like yin and yang, each articulating 
the other, in a more advanced state of global governance. Given the premise that the Chinese 
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harmony concept, both past and present, comprises mutuality in the presence of difference 
(like the musical or culinary arts), so too China’s conceptualization of sovereignty as being 
an inclusive as well as an exclusive condition will be needed. The cultivation of self and the 
‘other’ is at the heart of such a ‘harmonious world’; China’s cultivation of self through 
harmonious society will need to make as much progress as its cultivation of harmony abroad. 
Otherwise the legitimacy of this party-civilization-state will be in question.  
 
Another issue that would need to be handled carefully is the traditional role of hierarchy in 
East Asian international relations. China would need to make extra efforts at reassuring those 
living near and far that it does not regard itself as the leading power of its region within a 
wider concert of powers. Otherwise the regional threat perceptions of peer actors such as 
Japan, India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will be aroused.  
 
Criticisms that China is parochial with its inclusion of ‘Chinese characteristics’ in borrowed 
systems (and is therefore hardly in a position for offering universal advice),75  is not so 
convincing when viewed in this light of multi-level awareness in the classical Chinese roots 
of ‘harmony’ and the nature of today’s globalization. Moreover a sense of autonomy goes 
only so far as celebrating difference rather than assenting to hegemonic uniformity. 
Epistemologically, to the West’s ‘being’ and ‘principles’ is China’s ‘process’ and the tao or 
way; Chinese thought likes to synthesize and contextualize. The next step in China’s global 
message of ‘harmonious world’ appears to be converging on a redefinition of national interest 
to account for global interest. In seeking the global interest, China (through both government 
and non-government organizations) will need to play a stronger role as a normative power in 
global society, advancing further shared development ideals as well as its unique value 
system. 
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